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The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and Working Time: Bauer, Kreuziger and 
Shimizu before the Grand Chamber 
 
Introduction 
The few words ‘paid annual leave’ in Article 7 of the working time Directive1 have 
given rise to many difficult legal issues. While the original Directive2 was enacted as 
a health and safety measure under then Article 118a of the EU Treaty (now Article 
153 of the Treaty on the Functioning on the European Union), from an early stage the 
right to paid annual leave was conceived as a fundamental social right. The process 
began with the opinion of Advocate General Tizzano in BECTU, who attributed the 
source of Article 7 to various human rights instruments, including the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, the European Social Charter, and the UN Charter of 
1966 on economic, social and cultural rights.3  While the Court (CJEU) has been more 
restrained in its sources, it has often had regard to the principles of the ILO, which 
are expressly referred to in the recitals to the Directive. For example, ILO 
Convention No. 132, Holidays with Pay (Revised), has been influential in relation to 
matters such as the holiday entitlement of sick workers4 and the requirement that 
‘normal remuneration’ is maintained in respect of the annual leave.5 
 
Three Grand Chamber judgments all delivered on the same day now add to the 
burgeoning CJEU case-law on the meaning and effect of this fundamental social 
right: Max-Planck v Shimizu,6 Kreuziger v Land Berlin7 and Stadt Wuppertal v Bauer.8 
Quite apart from the important substantive issues at stake, the judgments in Shimizu 
and Bauer are relevant to a wider issue. Foremost among the human rights 
instruments referred to by AG Tizanno in BECTU was Article 31(2) of the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights (the ‘Charter’), which gives ‘every worker’ the right, 
among other matters, to limits on maximum working hours, to daily and weekly rest 
periods and to an annual period of paid annual leave. However, in subsequent cases 
on working time the Charter only figured as a passing reference in the CJEU’s 
mantra that the right to paid annual leave was ‘expressly laid down in Article 31(2) 
                                                 
1 Council Directive 2003/88/EC of 4 November 2003 concerning certain aspects of the 
organisation of working time. 
2 Council Directive 93/104/EC of 23 November 1993 concerning certain aspects of the 
organisation of working time. 
3 Opinion of AG Tizanno, §§23-28, in Regina (BECTU) v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, 
C-173/99, 8 February 2001.  
4 See, for example, CJEU (Grand Chamber) in Shultz-Hoff v Deutsche Rentenversicherung Bund; 
Stringer v Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, joined cases C-350/06 and C520-06, 20 January 2009, 
§§37-38 and in KHS AG v Winfried Schulte, Case C-214/10, 22 November 2011, §§41-42. 
5 See Article 7 of the ILO Convention and e.g. CJEU (First Chamber), British Airways v 
Williams, C-155/10, 15 September 2011, §§19-21 (see too AG Trstenjak §50). 
6 CJEU (Grand Chamber), Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Fördering de Wissenschaften eV v Tetsuji 
Shimizu, C648-16, 6 November 2018. 
7 CJEU (Grand Chamber), Kreuziger v Land Berlin, C-619/16, 6 November 2018. 
8 CJEU (Grand Chamber), Stadt Wuppertal v Bauer; Willmeroth v Broßon, Joined cases C-596/16, 
C-570/16, 6 November 2018. 
of the Charter’.9 When, in Dominguez, AG Trstenjak opined at considerable length 
that the right to paid annual leave in Article 31 enshrined a fundamental right but 
lacked horizontal effect between private individuals, the Grand Chamber ignored 
the issue altogether, referring instead to the conventional tools of vertical direct 
effect and harmonious interpretation of the Directivedomestic law.10 This was taken 
as a sign of the Charter’s impotence.11 
 
That has all now changed as a result of Shimizu and Bauer, in which the Grand 
Chamber finally addressed the interrelationship between the Directive, international 
human rights instruments and Article 31 of the Charter. Signalling a new direction in 
the enforcement of social rights in the Charter, the judgments are relevant to other 
social provisions in the ‘solidarity’ Chapter of the Charter and highlight a new 
direction in the means of giving effect to EU social law. 
 
Analysis of decisions 
In both Kreuziger and Shimizu the CJEU clarified the circumstances in which a 
worker could lose the right to paid annual leave (or a payment in lieu on termination 
of employment) under national law because he had the opportunity to take leave but 
did not do so, an issue already foreshadowed in Schultz-Hoff.12 Using almost 
identical language in both cases, the Court focussed on the need for an actual 
opportunity to take leave, sensitive to the worker’s weak position in the employment 
relationship, the risk of incentives or encouragement not to take leave and the 
importance of effective enforcement of the mandatory duties in the Directive.13 In 
that light, the right could not lapse simply because a worker did not apply to take 
annual leave in the relevant year. Rather, the employer bore the burden of 
demonstrating that the worker was properly encouraged to take leave but, in full 
knowledge of the legal consequences, deliberately chose not to exercise the 
opportunity.14 National legislation which provided for the automatic loss of the right 
was, therefore, incompatible with the Directive. 
 
In Bauer, the CJEU faced applications by two widows for the payment of allowances 
in lieu of holiday not taken by their former husbands when the husbands’ 
employment terminated by reason of death. The Court held that a worker’s death 
did not entail the loss of the right to annual leave or the linked right to a payment in 
lieu, the compensation for which passed to his estate.15 The reason, according to the 
CJEU, is that the loss of the right would undermine its ‘very substance’ and would 
                                                 
9 See, among many others, British Airways v Williams §18; CJEU (Tenth Chamber), Sobczyzyn v 
Szkola Podstawowa, C-178/15, 30 June 2016, §20. 
10 CJEU (Grand Chamber), Dominguez v Centre Informatique du Centre Ouest Atlantique, C-
282/10, 24 November 2012 (cf. AG Trstenjak §§71-88). 
11 See AG Mengozzi in Fenoll v Centre d’aide par le travail, C-316/13, 12 June 2014, §§59-61. 
12 Schultz-Hoff, ibid, §43. 
13 Kreuziger §§48-9, 52, 55; Shimizu §§41-2, 45, 48. 
14 Kreuziger, §§52-4; Shimizu §§45-47. 
15 Bauer, §§38-50. 
failure to ensure the effectiveness of the entitlement.16 Once again, the judgment in 
Bauer is based on the language of fundamental social rights, emphasised by the 
support the CJEU drew from the unqualified terms of Article 31 of the Charter, with 
the health and safety objectives of the Directive given little prominence. 
 
This approach fed into the second, important aspect of Bauer, concerned with the 
Charter and its effect on domestic law. The husband of Mrs Broßon, one of the 
widows, was employed by a private sector employer. The referring court stated 
expressly that any interpretation by which the right to a payment in lieu passed to a 
deceased worker’s estate would be contra legem and hence exceeded the limits of the 
duty owed by domestic courts to interpret national law in accordance with the 
Directive.17 Undeterred, and emphasising the need to ensure the effectiveness of 
fundamental social rights, AG Bot considered that the right to paid annual leave in 
Article 31 of the Charter possessed all the necessary qualities for it to be relied on 
directly in disputes between private individuals.18 According to AG Bot, the 
Directive and Charter mutually reinforce each other because the case-law on the 
Directive fed into the normative content of Article 31.19 
 
The CJEU’s judgment similarly displays how a positive feedback mechanism can 
operate among related rights’ instruments. First, the CJEU held that the meaning of 
‘paid annual leave’ in the Directive and Article 31 of the Charter was identical, with 
each reinforcing the other.20 Thus, the strict conditions under which rights in the 
Charter can be limited21 fed into Article 7 of the Directive, the substantive content of 
which in turn informed the Charter.22 Second, it held that the right to annual leave 
was not established by the Directive but, rather, was an ‘essential principle of EU 
social law’ based on earlier instruments such as the Community Charter of 
Fundamental Social Rights of Workers, the European Social Charter and ILO 
Convention No. 132.23 That essential principle was then reflected, affirmed and 
strengthened by the mandatory terms of Article 31 of the Charter.24 The upshot was 
that Article 31 was itself a sufficient basis for conferring individual legal rights on 
every worker, so that a national court was required to disapply national legislation 
inconsistent with the full effectiveness of that right.25 As if that were not enough, the 
Grand Chamber repeated pretty much the same language in Shimizu.26  
 
Implications and Conclusions 
                                                 
16 Bauer, §§49-50. 
17 Bauer, §15. 
18 AG Bot, Bauer, §§79-85. 
19 Ibid, §§86-91 
20 Bauer, §§57-61. 
21 Charter, Article 52(1). 
22 Bauer, §57-59. 
23 Ibid, §§80-83. 
24 Ibid, §§84-85. 
25 Ibid, §§86-91. 
26 Shimizu, §§62-80. 
At least two significant implications can be drawn from Bauer, Kreuziger and Shimizu 
The first is that the right to annual leave is now expressly conceived as a 
fundamental social right grounded in international human rights instruments. The 
various sources of the right combine synergistically to enhance the protection of 
workers. They include the European Social Charter which AG Bot saw as an 
important factor supporting the direct effect of Article 31.27  The result is a powerful 
right of wide scope which cannot be derogated from either under the Directive itself 
nor under the Charter, save in accordance with the strict conditions of Article 52(1). 
The recognition in Kreuziger and Shimizu that workers should not automatically lose 
the right simply because they did not apply to take leave reflects the enhanced status 
of the fundamental right, loosened from any detrimental effect on a worker’s health 
and safety. 
 
The second matter, connected to the first, is how the Charter will contribute to the 
enforcement of social rights. The early signs in AMS were that the solidarity 
provisions of the Charter would add little independent weight to the substantive 
provisions in social Directives.28 As a result of Bauer and Shimizu the Charter now 
supplements or even supplants social Directives, at least as regards those provisions 
framed in mandatory and unconditional terms. AG Pitruzella has already indicated 
that the effect of Bauer and Shimizu is equally applicable to other working time rights 
in Article 31;29 the same logic should apply to other unconditional provisions in 
Chapter IV. When combined with the right to an effective remedy in Article 47 of the 
Charter, itself used as an independent basis for overriding national limitations on 
remedies for infringement of working time rights,30 the reinvigorated Charter 
provides a powerful boost to individual judicial protection and the systemic delivery 
of the fundamental rights. In common with protection against discrimination, at EU 
level working time rights are now horizontally effective fundamental social rights, 













                                                 
27 AG Bot, Bauer, §94. 
28 CJEU, Association de Médiation Sociale v Union Locale des Syndicats CGT (Grand Chamber), C-
176/12, 12 January 2014. 
29 Federacíon de Servicios de Comisiones Obreras v Deutsche Bank, C-55/18, 31 January 2019, §§94-
97. 


















        
 
 








         
